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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS
NEGLIGLENT FAILURE TO STOP ESCALATOR
Action for the injuries sustained by a six year old boy who lost
his balance and fell to the bottom of escalator in defendant's store.
Held: defendant's failure to stop escalator with reasonable prompt-
ness constituted negligence.
There is-pno general duty to aid a person who is in peril.2 A
relationship between the parties, however, may impose a dutya The
relation may be created by an economic advantage to the defendant. 4
Thus a carrier must give reasonable assistance to a passenger in peril,5
an employer must aid an employee injured in the course of employ-
ment,6 and a ship must help a seaman who has fallen overboard.7
Similarly, there is a duty to assist an mvitee or business guest in
time of peril, even though the initial injury was not caused by de-
fendant's negligence.8 In the instant case, the store had the exclu-
sive means of stopping the escalator and extricating the plaintiff.9
1L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 34 N.E. (2d) 177 (Ind. App. 1941).
2 Allen v. Hixon, 111 Ga. 460, 36 S.E. 810 (1900); Hurley v. Edding-
field, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901); Osterlind v. Hill, 263
Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1938); Bohlen, Moral Duty to Aid Others
as a Basis of Tort Liability (1908) 56 u. OF PA. L. REV. 217, 316
passim.
3 HARPER, TORTS (1933) 199.
4 Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts
(1905) 44 A.M. L. REG. (N.s.) 209, 273, 337. Cf. Davis v. Keller, 85
Ind. App. 9, 150 N.E. 70 (1928) (sudden emergency may give rise
to duty to aid); Whiteside v. Southern R.R., 128 N.C. 229, 38
S.E. 878 (1901) (knowledge of serious peril creates a sufficient
relation).
5 Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co., Adm'r v. Cleveland R.R., 57 Ind. App.
644, 106 N.E. 739 (1914); Layne v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 175
Mo. App. 34, 157 S.W. 850 (1913), Yazoo & M.V. R.R. v. Byrd,
89 Miss. 308, 42 So. 286 (1906). See Warner, Duty of a Railway
Company to Care for a Person it has Without Fault Rendered
Helpless (1919) 7 CALIF. L. REV. 312.6 Cushman v. Cloverland Coal & Mining Co., 170 Ind. 402, 84 N.E.
759 (1908); Hunicke v. Meramec Quarry Co., 262 Mo. 560, 172
S.W. 43 (1914).
7 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Lines, 287 U.S. 367 (1932); Harris v.
Penn. R.R., 50 F. (2d) 866 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931), (1932) 17 CORN.
L. Q. 505.
s Katakoa v. May Dep't Stores Co., 28 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D. C. Calif.
1939) (by implication); Wolff v. Weymire, 52 Iowa 533, 3 N.W.
541 (1879); Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 11 N.W. 1 (1907).
See PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 635 (definition of business visitor).
Cf. Grogan v. O'Keefe's Inc., 267 Mass. 189, 166 N.E. 721 (1929)
(child accompanying parents held to be business visitor).
9 "A passenger by placing himself in charge of company is confined by
very necessity to the confines of the conveyance, being in effect
imprisoned there, and he must look to the carrier to aid him when
he is in peril. This duty exists irrespective of whether convey-
ance is a common carrier or not." Bohlen, Moral Duty to Aid
Others as a Basis of Tort Liability (1908) 56 u. OF PA. L. REV. 219,
229. Cases holding escalators common carriers: Heffernon v.
Mandel Bros., 297 Ill. App. 272, 17 N.E. (2d) 528 (1938), Mc-
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The court's meticulous determination of the exact moment at
which the defendant's negligence began, creates the difficult problem
of measuring the damages. The court predicated liability solely upon
the aggravation of the injury. Failure to instruct jury as to sever-
ability of damages forms the basis of the dissent.' 0
The question of apportionment is primarily one of feasibility and
practical convenience in splitting the total harm into separate parts."
Apportionment is usually permitted where part of th damage is
attributable to an innocent cause.' 2 A distinction is made between in-
jury resulting from defendant's reasonable conduct, and injuries ag-
gravated by the defendant's negligence.' s
Similar to the principal case are those where plaintiff's negli-
gence played no part in bringing about an impact or accident, but
aggravated the ensuing injury.14 In Connecticut, the court refused to
make any division, and awarded the plaintiff the entire amount.15
In Iowa 16 and Kansas, 7 damages were apportioned. The better view
Bride v. May Dep't Stores Co., 390 Ohio App. 420, 177 N.E. 773
(1931), aff'd, 124 Ohio St. 264, 178 N.E. 12 (1931). Contra: Strat-
ton v. J. J. Newberry Co., 117 Conn. 522, 169 Atl., 56 (1933). The
courts emphasis that an escalator was a common carrier in the
instant case, seems unnecessary. De Bois v. Boston El. Ry. Co.,
276 Mass. 98, 176 N.E. 920 (1931) (whether court technically
correct in classifying escalator a common carrier immaterial; in
either event the passenger is in the same helpless condition).
10 L. S. Ayres Co. v. Hicks, 34 N.E. (2d) 177, 188 (Ind. App. 1941)
(trial court instructions, "In determining the amount of damages
which you award plaintiff, it is proper to consider every phase
of his injuries...").
1" Prosser, Joint Torts & Several Liability (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REV.
413; See Jackson, Joint Torts & Several Liability (1939) 17 TEX.
L. REV. 399. An analogy may be suggested in problem of splitting
a cause of action against a single defendant in the pleading cases.
Gavit, The Code Cause of Action (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 802.
12 McAdams v. Chicago R.I. & P. R. Co., 200 Iowa 732, 205 N.W. 310
(1925); Rex v. Town of Alamagordo, 42 N.M. 325, 77 P. (2d) 765(1938). Contra: Willie v. Minn. Power & Light Co., 190 Minn. 95,
250 N.W. 809 (1928); Note (1928) MINN. L. REV. 91.
'$Jenkins v. Pa. R.R., 67 N.J.L. 331, 51 Atl. 704 (1902) (smoke
nuisance).
14 Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762 (1929); Green,
Mahoney v. Beatman: A Study in Proximate Cause (1930) 39
YALE L.T. 532.
15 Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762 (1929) (plain-
tiff's excessive speed in driving was not responsible for the col-
lision, but greatly increased damages resulting from it). But see
HARPER, TORTS (1933) 299-300; Note (1938) 22 MINN. L. REV. 410.
le Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, (1866) (plaintiff's
damages from a runaway enhanced by negligent failure to have
more than one helper).
17 O'Keefe v. Kansas City Western R.R., 87 Kan. 322, 124 Pac. 416
(1912) (plaintiff's injuries from fall increased by prior intoxi-
cation, which did not contribute to fall). See Smithwich v. Hall
& Upson Co., 59 Conn. 261, 263, 21 Atl. 24, 25 (1890) (act or
omission that merely increased extent of loss may affect amount
of damages in a given case).
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reduces the plaintiff's recovery to the extent his injuries have been
aggravated by his own antecedent negligence1 s
In the principal case, there are obvious difficulties in apportioning
physical and mental suffering and medical expense. Such difficulties
are not insuperable. They are no greater than apportionment upon
the basis of potential damage from one cause, which reduces the loss
inflicted by another. 19 Each apportionment case, however, must turn
on its own particular facts.
Logic and consistency m the principal case demand an apportion-
ment of damages. A correct instruction as to damages might have
resulted in a smaller verdict. A retrial should have been granted on
the issue of damages.20
TRADE REGULATION
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION AND THE
SHERMAN ACT
Four affiliated General Motors Corporations and seventeen indi-
viduals were prosecuted, under Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, for conspiring to restrain interstate trade and commerce in
General Motors automobiles. The alleged purpose of the conspiracy
was to compel General Motors dealers to use General Motors Accept-
ance Corporation financing in their purchases and sales of automobiles.
The purpose was stated to have been accomplished by cancelling the
franchises of dealers who refused to use the financing, by favoring
dealers who used the finance service, in the matter of deliveries of
automobiles and other appropriate means. A jury in the District
Court acquitted the individual defendants and found the four cor-
porate defendants guilty. Judgment entered upon verdict fining each
corporate defendant $5000. Held, affirmed on appeal.'
The defendants contended that, since they were affiliated non-
competing corporations, any restraint by them of the interstate com-
merce in their own automobiles was not prohibited by the Sherman
Act.2 The title to the automobiles usually passes to the dealers before
shipment and the commerce which was restrained was the commerce
Is Notes (1938) 22 MINN. L. REV. 410, (1930) 66 A.LR. 1121, 1135,
(1930) 30 col. L. REV. 268.
19Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 85 N.H. 449, 216 Atl.
111 (1932); See Peaslee, Multiple Causation & Damage (1934)
47 HARV. L. REV. 1127. See also, Felter v. Delaware & Hudson
R.R., 19 F. Supp. 825 (1937), aff'd 98 F. (2d) 868 (C.C.A. 3d,
1938) (damage for only portion of total value), (1937) 12 TEMPLE
LQ. 132.
2oK0ummer Motor Bua & Taxi Co. v. Mech. Lumber Co., 175 Ark. 750,
300 S.W. 399; May Dep't Stores Co. v. Bell, 61 F. (2d) 83 (C.C.A.
8th, 1932) (issues of retrial limited to damages).
I United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. (2d) 376 (C.C.A. 7th,
1941), cert. dented, 10 u.sj WE= 3113.
2 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1934).
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